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A PRESUMPTION OF GUILT:




Since the advent of the so-called "Global War on Terror," the United States of
America has responded to the crimes carried out on American soil that day by
using or threatening to use military force against Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North
Korea, Syria, and Pakistan. The resulting projection of American military power
resulted in the overthrow of two governments - the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
the fate of which remains uncertain, and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq - and
"war talk" ebbs and flows with respect to the other countries on the U.S.
government's "most wanted" list. As I have written elsewhere, the Bush
administration employed a legal framework to conduct these military operations
that was highly dubious - and hypocritical - arguing, on the one hand, that the
United States was on a war footing with terrorists but that, on the other hand,
because terrorists are so-called "unlawful enemy combatants," they were not
entitled to the protections of the laws of war as regards their detention and
treatment.1 The creation of this euphemistic and novel term - the "unlawful enemy
combatant" - has bewitched the media and even distinguished justices of the
United States Supreme Court. It has been employed to suggest that the prisoners
captured in this "war" are not entitled to "normal" legal protections, but should
instead be subjected to a r~gime d'exception - an extraordinary regime-created
de novo by the Executive branch (until it was blessed by Congress in the Military
. Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute,
Washington University in St. Louis. This article was originally given as the Henry & Mary Bryan
Lecture at the 2008 Sutton Colloqium held on Oct. 25, 2008 at the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law.
I would like to thank both Denver College of Law & The Nanda Center for International Law for
this invitation, and express my gratitude to Ved and Kathryn Nanda and their wonderful students for
their gracious hospitality. This is a very special opportunity for me, as my work in this area began at a
conference held here in 2002, at a time during which it was very difficult to criticize Bush
administration policy. I, and others like me, are deeply indebted to Ved Nanda, who provided a safe
space in which to speak truth to power at a time when not many law schools or universities were willing
to do so. I am honored to return here today, in the final days of the Bush presidency, to reflect upon
what the past seven years have wrought, and consider the way forward.
1. Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135,
140 n.16 (2004).
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Commissions Act of 2006)2 _ in which any protections afforded the suspects
become simply a matter of grace.
One cannot find the term "unlawful enemy combatant" in the Geneva
Conventions or other treatises on the law of war. The administration traces its use
to the case of Ex parte Quirin, a World War II opinion addressing the question
whether Nazi "spies and saboteurs," who had entered the United States during the
war, could be tried before a U.S. military commission.3 Like many other Bush
administration "legal opinions," the use of Quirin as the legal foundation not only
for the invention of this new legal category, but to justify indefinite detention,
coercive interrogation and other mistreatment, is deeply problematic. What the
Court held in Quirin was that because the defendants (mostly German saboteurs)
had entered the United States to engage in acts of spying and sabotage, they were
not only liable to be captured and detained (like all POWs), but could, in addition,
be tried before a military commission for acts violating the laws of war.4 The
Quirin opinion makes reference to "acts which render their belligerency unlawful,"
and from this language, which meant nothing more than that enemy prisoners who
are accused of violating the laws of war may be tried as such, the Executive
Branch developed a doctrine of "unlawful enemy combatant (UEC)," as
subsequently defined in the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 5 Yet the United
States Supreme Court, while admitting the uncertain contours and origin of the
term, accepted the President's invocation of it in the Hamdi case. Indeed, the
Court held only that Hamdi, a "citizen-detainee" seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant could receive notice of the basis for his
classification, and an opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions.6
Only Scalia and Stevens squarely addressed the question of Hamdi's status, finding
that "absent suspension [of the writ of habeas corpus] the Executive's assertion of
military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without
charge."7 The same is true of the Supreme Court's opinion in Boumediene, which
although striking down the suspension of habeas corpus in the Military
Commission's Act of 2006, did not question the legitimacy of the classification
scheme in the first place. 8 Indeed, like the plurality's view in Hamdi, Justice
Kennedy's opinion only permits the detainee to have a meaningful right to rebut
the Pentagon's evidence.9
2. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Military Commissions Act of 2006].
3. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
4. Id. at 36-37, 47-48.
5. Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 2, §948a.
6. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
7. Id. at 554. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia and Stevens appear to have been correct: like John
Walter Lindh, the so called "American Taliban," Hamdi should have been tried for a crime or released.
Indeed, after the Supreme Court's decision, he was exiled to Saudi Arabia and denaturalized. No
charges were ever filed.
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2234-35 (2008).
9. Id. at 2238-39.
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This dehumanization of a whole category of human beings - the "suspected
terrorist" or "unlawful enemy combatant" - has had pernicious effects upon the
American legal system and severely harmed America's international standing.
These doctrines and the propaganda supporting them have led to the systematic use
of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment used on prisoners detained
in the legal limbo known as Guantanamo Bay, Kandahar prison in Afghanistan,
and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, as well as the rendition of terror suspects to third
countries and to "black sites" scattered around the world for detention,
interrogation, mistreatment, and sometimes death.10 Although most (but not all) of
the individuals subjected to this regime have been foreigners, the impact of this
Executive Activism has been on the American legal regime and the American
psyche, for it has been U.S. investigators, U.S. courts, and U.S. lawyers, that
carried out the government's plan. To this extent, all Americans are responsible
for and affected by these policies, which have been carried out in our names, even
if those targeted are, for the most part, aliens. Indeed, the Los Angeles Times
recently reported that the officers in charge of the detention of Jose Padilla and
Yasser Hamdi, both U.S. citizens detained as "unlawful enemy combatants," in
military jails inside the United States, became increasingly uncomfortable and
even alarmed that they were being directed to handle their prisoners under
"Guantanamo Rules" - depriving them of all natural light for months, repeatedly
interrogating them, denying them access to attorneys and mail from home,
allowing them no contact with anyone other than guards, and depriving them, for
years, even of minor distractions such as a soccer ball or a dictionary."l
This is a serious problem, both quantitatively and qualitatively, because the
notion of creating a legal classification whereby all rights granted by law -
domestic and international - become simply a matter of executive grace violates
not only separation of powers principles but several other foundational principles
of the American legal system, including equality before the law and the right to be
presumed innocent before being subjected to criminal proceedings (whether civil
or military). Indeed, these policies have turned U.S. legal principles upside down,
resulting in a presumption of guilt applicable to anyone accused of acts of
terrorism by the government - that the terror suspect, or "UEC" must rebut in
order to defeat his or her imprisonment - under circumstances that hardly result in
the kind of equality of treatment required by international law and U. S.
Constitutional principles.
I will briefly survey the application of international human rights law,
international humanitarian law, and the U.S. enemy combatant cases litigated thus
10. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under
International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309 (2006); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary
Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200
(2007) [hereinafter Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition]; Leila Nadya Sadat, Shattering the Nuremberg
Consensus: U.S. Rendition Policy and International Criminal Law, 3 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 65 (2008) (no
access to the YJIA, but should be on file with the author).
11. Pamela Hess, Officer Wrote of harsh treatment of U.S. detainee, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at
2009
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far, before venturing some thoughts on the continuing dangers of these policies,
and what might be done to reverse them. I conclude on a cautionary note.
Although the new administration may wish to break with the Bush legacy, it may
be difficult to do so. "Guantanamo rules" penetrated quickly and deeply into the
American legal system, and many of the individuals who wrote them continue to
exercise influence and to assert their applicability, extension or incorporation into
new legal doctrines and institutions, such as the establishment of so called
"national security courts." This essay concludes with seven recommendations to
President Obama to strengthen America's human rights infrastructure, and help
prevent future human rights violations by the United States of America.
II. HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
A. International Human Rights Law
The presumption of innocence is found in all modem day human rights
instruments. The presumption has a long pedigree, and is codified in the famous
French Declarations des droits de l'homme et du citoyen12 and enshrined in many,
if not most, of the world's constitutions in some form or another, or is incorporated
by judicial interpretation, as is the case in the United States. 3
It was included in article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and subsequently codified in article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which provides that "[e]veryone charged with a criminal
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law.' 14 A government could argue that the kind of preventive (indefinite)
detention provided for in Guantanamo Bay is not covered by this prohibition
because the individuals held there have never actually been accused of a crime;
instead, they have been incarcerated as "unlawful enemy combatants" who will,
for the most part, never face charges brought before a court of law or a military
commission. Yet, earlier drafts of the Universal Declaration referred not to
persons charged with crimes but to "any person" or "everyone," and the view of
Eleanor Roosevelt and Ren6 Cassin, two principal drafters of the UDHR, was that
the guarantee should benefit "everyone," regardless of whether they were involved
in criminal proceedings or not.' 5 Accordingly, the presumption is particularly
important for those charged in criminal proceedings, but still applicable to those
who are not. Moreover, article 9 of the Covenant also prohibits arbitrary detention
and provides that "no one" shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, or
deprived of liberty except on "grounds and in accordance with [legal
12. See Declaration des Droits de L'homme et du Citoyen de 1789, art. IX, available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale. fr/histoire/dudh/ 1789.asp.
13. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) ("The purpose of the trial stage from the
State's point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
14. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 14(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; See also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 11(1),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
15. STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 155 (Oxford Univ. Press
2005).
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procedures]. 16 The classification of an individual by the Executive Branch as an
"unlawful enemy combatant" subject to indefinite detention violates this provision,
as well.
The United States could have derogated from articles 9 and 14 of the
Covenant, for the Covenant specifically permits derogation from certain of its
provisions "in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation,"
subject to certain requirements: the measures taken must be "strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation," "consistent with international law," and non-
discriminatory, that is, taken "solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language,
religion or social origin."' 7 Other countries have filed formal derogations when
confronted with acts of terrorism, including the United Kingdom.' 8 The United
States has not. Moreover, international human rights tribunals, including the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have condemned indefinite detention without charges even in terrorism cases,
holding in one case that even a fourteen day period without judicial intervention is
"exceptionally long."' 9  Finally, while a formal derogation permits some
innovation in criminal proceedings there can be no derogation from the ban on
torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment found in article 7 of the
Covenant.20 Guantanamo-style interrogations run afoul of this provision, as well.
Finally, it is worth noting that, while acts of terrorism may violate the
international human rights of victims, the individuals suspected of committing
those acts are not, by virtue of their classification as "terrorists" by the executive
branch or media, stripped of their fundamental human rights. Indeed, the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have unequivocally stated that alleged terrorists - even undisputed terrorists -
remain protected by human rights law.2 '
What, then, of the application of international human rights law or the
constitution during war; is it correct, as Cicero wrote, that inter arma enim silent
leges - that the laws fall mute in times of war? Or that they, to paraphrase former
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, "speak with a somewhat different voice?
'22
While the United States has argued otherwise, courts, as well as treaty monitoring
bodies such as the Torture Committee and the Human Rights Committee, have
16. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 9(i).
17. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4(i).
18. See DAVID ANDERSON & JEMIMA STRATFORD, JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS INQUIRY INTO UK DEROGATIONS FROM CONVENTION ON RIGHTS 3 (2002),
http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/derogations.pdf.
19. Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, at para. 78.
20. See ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4(2).
21. See, e.g., Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (ser. A), 62 (1988) (finding that
the UK had violated Article 5(1) protections of the European Convention on Human Rights after
detaining alleged terrorist suspects for several days.); see also Durand & Ugarte Case, 2001 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68, at 118 (Aug. 16, 2000) (finding that the military forces in Peru used excessive
forces disproportional to the perceived threat to confront alleged terrorists).
22. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES N WARTIME 225 (Vintage
Books 1998).
2009
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found that human rights law continues to apply in armed conflict, subject to
23
specialized rules that may be carved out by international humanitarian law, a
body of law to which I now turn.
B. International Humanitarian Law
What is an individual's status under international humanitarian law when
captured during an armed conflict? Under the laws of war, once the United States
determined to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, the applicable law was primarily set
out in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which have, since World War II, been
the gold standard regarding the capture, detention, treatment, and trial of prisoners
of war and civilian internees.24 Indeed, the four Geneva Conventions enjoy
unparalleled support among States, having been ratified by virtually every country
in the world, including the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq,25and are, without
a doubt, part of the customary laws of war.26 Geneva law, as it has come to be
called, requires that prisoners be treated humanely, forbids secret detention sites,
and appoints the International Committee of the Red Cross as the international
monitor for Geneva compliance.27 The United States was a principal mover and
negotiator of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, and not only became a party to
them, but their custodian too, with the original signed copies residing in a vault at
the U.S. Department of State.28
Early in the GWOT, however, over the objections of U.S. Secretary of State,
Colin Powell,29 and the State Department's Legal Advisor, William H. Taft, IV,
30
23. For judicial decisions see, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), at para. 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9), at para. 106; Coard et al. v.
United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. 39
(1999); accord Sadat, supra note 1, at 140-142.
24. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC Ill]. Nonetheless, even if not classified as
POWs, those captured would fall within the provisions of Geneva IV, on civilians. See generally
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; see also COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR 271 (Oscar Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].
25. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, Treaties & Documents by Date, http://www.icrc.
org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (scroll down and follow « State parties > hyperlink for all Geneva
Conventions).
26. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993). This report was unanimously adopted by the Security Council. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
27. Protocol I elaborates upon the Geneva Conventions, and although it has not been ratified by
the U.S., many of its provisions, particularly those regarding the humane treatment of prisoners are
considered part of customary international law. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 9 (2008).
29. See Memorandum from Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability
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lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice argued that the United States should
abandon the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in favor of a de novo legal
regime that they believed would be superior for the capture, detention, treatment,
and trial of enemy prisoners, whether captured in the United States or abroad. In
the words of then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales, the "new paradigm"
of "the war against terrorism render[ed] obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners and render[ed] quaint some of its provisions ...
,31
President Bush ultimately accepted the Department of Justice's arguments,
and declined to apply Geneva law to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees in U.S.
custody.32 A diplomatic and legal furor ensued, and the extremely negative
international reaction generated by the creation and operation of the U.S. prison at
Guantanamo Bay, as well as other U.S. detention centers, is summarized by the
words of Amnesty International, which, in its 2005 annual report, suggested that
the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay had become the "gulag of our
times.
33
Nearly two years after the September 11 th attacks and the Afghan invasion,
Iraq was invaded by the United States and a "coalition of the willing," 34 one
justification for which was the continuation of the GWOT.35 Although the United
of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, at 122-23 (Karen J. Greenberg & Johsua L. Dratel eds., 2005)
[hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].
30. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2,
2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 129; see also Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans
and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 825-26 (2005).
31. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President to George W. Bush,
President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 119
[hereinafter Gonzales, Geneva Memo].
32. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President et a].,
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 29, at 134. The memo is elliptical in its reasoning, concluding that al Qaeda
members do not receive the protection of the Geneva Conventions because "al Qaeda is not a High
Contracting Party to Geneva." Id. As regards the Taliban, although the memo concludes that Geneva
applies to the conflict with the Taliban, the President nonetheless determined that "the Taliban detainees
are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva."
Id. at 135.
33. Irene Khan, Foreword to AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
2005: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS (2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/POL10/001/2005/en/6287f77f-d53a-11 dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/pol100012005en.html.
34. See Steve Schifferes, U.S. Names "Coalition of the Willing," BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm.
35. The Bush administration repeatedly conflated al Qaeda and Iraq as enemies in the War on
Terror, leading more than seventy percent of all Americans to believe that Saddam Hussein was
responsible in some way for the September I 11h attacks. See, e.g., Bush Administration on Iraq 9/11
Link, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3119676.stm.
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States determined that Geneva law applied to the conflict in Iraq,36 the decision not
to apply Geneva law to the detainees captured in the Afghan conflict clearly spilled
over to the Iraq theatre, where, once again, credible allegations of prisoner
mistreatment and violations of international law were made against the United
States.37 The most visible evidence of this abuse was shocking photos emanating
from the U.S. detention facility at Abu Ghraib. Indeed, the prisoner abuse problem
was much more serious, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as regards detainees
in Iraq, than the problems at Guantanamo Bay. In all U.S. detention facilities,
however, there has been egregious mistreatment of detainees, violations that have
contravened the minimum guarantees of common article 3, as well as many
specific provisos of the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.38 The United States has argued that it may deprive detainees of all
protections due to their UEC status; the International Committee of the Red Cross
has protested to the contrary. It is the view of the ICRC (correct, in my estimation)
that either the Third Geneva Convention applies if they are POWs; or the Fourth
applies if they are not. 39 Law, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and during armed
conflict, captives are presumptively entitled to POW status - unless an article five
Tribunal determines otherwise.4 °
III. THE U.S. ENEMY COMBATANT CASES
A. Individuals Tried in U.S. Courts
Turning now to the treatment of detainees in U.S. courts or within U.S.
jurisdiction, the picture is more confused. Three detainees have been tried in U.S.
federal courts on criminal charges stemming from their connections to the
September 1 1 th attacks, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban: John Walker Lindh, the so-called
"American Taliban;" 4 1 Jos6 Padilla, the alleged "dirty bomber; 4 2 and Zacharias
Moussaoui, the "so-called" twentieth hijacker. 43 Two of those tried - Lindh and
Padilla - were U.S. citizens, and although Lindh was picked up in Afghanistan
following the U.S. invasion of that country on October 7 th, Padilla was arrested in
O'Hare airport returning from four years of living abroad. While these individuals
were nominally entitled to a presumption of innocence, certain irregularities
regarding their trials, particularly in terms of the evidence introduced against them
and credible allegations of coercive interrogation and cruel treatment (in the cases
of Lindh and Padilla), suggest that the administration's reversal of the presumption
36. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 476-77 (2002).
37. See Iraq: U.S. Prisoner Abuse Sparks Concerns Over War Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
April 29, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/04/29/iraq-us-prisoner-abuse-sparks-concems-over-
war-crimes.
38. See id; see also 3 Soldiers Charged In Deaths of Iraq Detainees, CBS NEWS, June 19, 2006,
http://cbs3.com/national/3rd.Brigade.Combat.2.269173.html; TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 1140-
41.
39. See GC III supra note 24; GC IV, supra note 24.
40. GC III, supra note 24, art. 5.
41. U.S. v. Lindh, 227 F.Supp.2d 565, 565 (E.D. Va. 2002).
42. Rumsfld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 426 (2004).
43. U.S. v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 220 (4th Cir. 2007).
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of innocence for all captives in the "war on terror," spilled over into the federal
courts, potentially distorting the outcomes of trials held under "normal rules."
Padilla's case is particularly disturbing, because his arrest was based upon
testimony from two individuals - Abu Zubaydah and Binyam Mohammed -
whom, as it transpires, had provided unreliable information under torture. 4  After
Padilla's arrest, he was classified as an "enemy combatant" by an order of June 9,
2002 signed by President Bush, and accused of plotting to set off a dirty bomb, an
accusation that appears to have been erroneous, or at least unprovable.45 He was
transferred to military custody and litigation ensued - leaving him there for 1307
days until,46 just as it appeared that the Supreme Court might review his case and
decide against the President's authority to indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen, he was
finally indicted and transferred to the US District Court for the Southern District of
Florida for trial. The trial did not involve any of the earlier allegations against
Padilla - only that he had attended an al Qaeda training camp.4 7 The trial judge
refused to find that Padilla's long military confinement - in which he was
allegedly held in isolation in a 7 by 9 foot cell, deprived of sleep, hooded and
forced to assume stress positions for long periods - did not render him unfit for
trial nor deprive him of a speedy trial. 48 Padilla was convicted and sentenced on
January 22, 2008 to 17 years and 4 months and is now in a supermax prison
facility here in Florence, Colorado.49 His mother is appealing the verdict.
50
B. Held in indefinite detention without trial or subject to military commissions?
Unlike Padilla, most Guantanamo detainees have not received a trial in
federal court. With respect to Guantanamo Bay, of the 775 originally brought
there, approximately 270 detainees remain, 200 of whom could be repatriated if a
country could be found to receive them. 51 Fewer than a dozen have been charged
44. Andrew Patel, Padilla v. Bush, in THE ENEMY COMBATANT PAPERS 663, 663 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2008).
45. See David Hancock, Judge: Charge Or Release Padilla, CBS NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/28/terror/main677099.shtml; see also Marisol Bello, 'Enemy
combatant' Padilla gets 17 years for conspiracy, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2008-01-22-padilla-sentencingN.htm; Enemy Combatant, CBS NEWS, http://www.
cbsnews.com/elements/2006/04/04/in-depth-us/timeline1469944_Omain.shtml (last visited April 16,
2009).
46. Stephen Vladek, The Anticlimactic Trial of Jose Padilla, JURIST, May 15, 2007, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/05/anticlimactic-trial-of-jose-padilla.php.
47. United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-Cooke, 2006 WL 3678567 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17,
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before a military commission leaving indefinite detention without charges to be
their fate.
The first detainee to be tried before a military commission at Guantanamo
Bay was Salim Ahmed Hamdan.53 Hamdan was captured in November 2001 by
the Northern Alliance, then turned over to U.S. military forces and sent to
Guantanamo in June 2002. 54 After years of litigation, he was the first individual to
be tried since the U.S. started transporting detainees to Guantanamo Bay in 2002.
His trial before a military commission came as a surprise, and in spite of a
perception of unfairness, resulted in at least a partial victory for the accused. He
was acquitted of the conspiracy charges and sentenced only to 5-1/2 years, with
credit for time served.55 He was scheduled to be released on December 31, 2008,
but the government recently announced its intention to return him to his home in
Yemen.56
IV. ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK
It is worrisome that matters may get worse before they get better. The
"Unlawful Enemy Combatant," category remains legally intact 57 and hundreds, if
not thousands, of detainees in and out of Guantanamo Bay have been subjected to
it. Even where it is not formally employed, "Guantanamo rules" appear to apply,
and the Bush administration has been persistent and unyielding in asserting its
ability to continue to hold individuals indefinitely under the UEC label. Indeed,
even following Hamdan's trial, President Bush continued to argue that he had the
right to hold Hamdan indefinitely - past the time of his sentence.58
The rendition program continues and access to the courts for victims is
blocked at every turn by the State secrets doctrine - even when it is clear that the
U.S. government has been mistaken in identifying a particular individual as a
suspected terrorist. This was the case with Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who
was picked up mistakenly at Kennedy airport and rendered by U.S. officials to
Syria where he was tortured for 10 months until the Canadian government secured
his release.5 9 Cruel treatment has not been renounced, and earlier this fall the New
52. Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 369, 373-74 (2007).
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54. Id.
55. Josh White & William Branigin, Hamdan to be Sent to Yemen, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008 at
Al.
56. Id.
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York Times published a story stating that the administration is no longer committed
to closing the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, although President Obama has
recommitted to closing the prison.
60
Additionally, the racism and anti-muslim/anti-arab sentiment that emerged
following the 9/11 attacks continue to fuel and distort U.S. foreign and domestic
policy - to scare the public and whip up sentiment for government policies that are
indefensible as a matter of law. Moreover, it has led to a plunge in support for the
United States and its policies worldwide. The U.S. has been brought to task before
the Human Rights Committee, the Torture Committee, the European Parliament,
and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. 61 Racism and ethnic slurs
surfaced in the Presidential campaign, where it was widely reported that robocalls
alleging that Obama took his oath of office on a Koran, were apparently being
heard all around the United States. These scare tactics are self defeating in terms
of winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world and misshape U.S. foreign
policy, causing U.S. policymakers to base decisions on prejudice rather than
facts.
62
Finally, there are now individuals arguing that the way to "fix" the public
relations problem of Guantanamo Bay is to make it worse - by creating specialized
63enational security courts and/or "amending" the Geneva Conventions. As to the
latter, the ICRC has steadfastly opposed amending the Conventions,64 and of
course, there are already two amendments, Protocols I and II, neither of which has
been ratified by the United States.65 If the United States is serious about working
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with other countries on mutually agreeable rules regarding detainee treatment of
terrorists captured in military operations, ratifying those protocols, before opening
negotiations on a third, is probably required. Moreover, it is unclear what this new
treaty would look like. No democracy will sign on to a treaty permitting cruel
treatment or torture as lawful interrogation techniques, nor would it be conceivable
that indefinite detention would be approved, which are the primary elements of the
current legal regime that the Bush administration wanted to change.
Several legal scholars have suggested the establishment of national security
courts that would be staffed by civilian judges, but have specialized rules for the
trial of terror suspects. 66 The courts would be located on military bases, 67 and
could presumably try detainees from Guantanamo Bay, if it was closed, or perhaps
newly captured individuals. The very purpose of these courts would be to make
the UEC category a permanent one, as the proposals would permit indefinite
preventive detention, as well as trials in "special courts" where defendants would
have been deprived of their right to remain silent. This would presumably mean
that they were forced to speak through coercion or some other means. 68
This idea is deeply problematic and probably unconstitutional. Indeed, it too
is based upon a presumption of guilt and evinces a pernicious classification
between ordinary citizen A and suspected terrorist B. Proponents of these courts
admit that they would like them so they can cut "constitutional comers," by
eliminating a defendant's right to remain silent, among other modifications - and
69presumably avoid the military justice system as well. Yet the Moussaoui,
Padilla, and Lindh trials demonstrated the clear ability of U.S. federal judges to try
cases involving alleged terrorists.70 The establishment of these new terror courts
has been condemned by the Constitution Project - a blue ribbon commission that
found that "establishing a new, unprecedented, and unnecessary system of
tribunals risks undermining the constitutional protections enshrined in our criminal
justice system, and would ultimately create far more problems than it could
possibly solve."'" As one federal judge has pointed out, the Classified Information
Procedures Act provides a set of rules for criminal cases that protects classified
information and still maintains "some degree of transparency. 7 2 Moreover, if the
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real issue is the use of evidence obtained through so called "enhanced interrogation
techniques," it cannot be constitutionally admissible in any federal court.
V CONCLUSION
America's legal system was sorely tested during the Bush years, and it is not
yet clear whether it will ever fully recover. At the same time, many lawyers
pushed back, particularly with regard to the more extreme departures from the law
advocated by Bush administration officials often risking their careers in so doing.
These included Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora and Navy Judge advocate
general Michael Lohr, 3 Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, and the military
lawyers assigned to defend detainees at Guantanamo Bay, to name a few. Civilian
lawyers like Michael Ratner, Joe Margulies, and Tom Wilner also played a key
role in bringing the rule of law back into U.S. government policy, risking their
reputations in doing so. 74 British lawyer Clive Stafford Smith filed lawsuits on
behalf of Guantanamo detainees, and law professors wrote articles and amicus
briefs attempting to influence government policy and the courts.7 5
Recently, U.S. courts have upheld the rule of law, particularly the United
States Supreme Court, which has issued a quartet of decisions providing detainees
with access to the courts and affirming their minimum rights under the laws of
war.76 At the same time, the Court did not address the fundamental problems with
the UEC classification itself, and its decisions were relatively narrow.
Nevertheless, the Rasul decision, holding that the detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay was within U.S. jurisdiction, the Hamdi decision upholding the right of
detainees to challenge the evidence against them, and the Hamdan decision finding
that no matter what their status, the detainees were entitled to the protection of
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (prohibiting cruel treatment) were
courageous and important decisions not just for the U.S. legal system, but
upholding the rule of law around the world. With the retirement of Justice
O'Connor, and the passing of former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, however,
the consensus on the Court is increasingly fragile, and the new President could
have a tremendous influence on these cases through his appointments.
Here are seven suggestions for President Obama's new administration:
First, close the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. The existence of
this prison camp has become a lightening rod for criticism of the United States and
a recruitment tool for international terrorists. It seems clear from what information
is available, that many of the approximately 250 detainees have been cleared for
release, but the administration has not been able to find a country willing to take
73. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 28, at 224-28.
74. Id., at 205-07.
75. See Biography of Clive Stafford Smith, REPRIEVE UK, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/staff
clivestaffordsmith.htm; see also John Semmens, Condemned Murderer Endorses Obama, Jul. 27, 2008,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/2052 11 /posts.
76. See Hamdi, supra note 6; Boumediene, supra note 8; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004).
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them.7 This has been advocated by former Secretaries of State, military officers,
human rights groups and legal and political experts. President Obama announced
during the campaign that he plans to close Guantanamo and he should make it a
top priority to keep this promise.
Second, ensure respect for the U.S. Constitution by using existing, ordinary
courts - civilian and military - to try Guantanamo detainees who are accused of
serious crimes. During his campaign, President Obama announced that he felt the
existing legal system could handle the detainees yet to be tried. More recently, it
was reported that he was considering the establishment of a "new legal system" to
handle the most sensitive cases, which is presumably a reference to the national
security courts discussed above. Yet a close look at the proposals suggests a
disdain for time-tested rules of law eerily similar to the lawyering style that
pervaded the administration during the past eight years. The federal courts - and
regularly constituted military courts - are more than capable of trying individuals
accused of terrorism and violations of the laws and customs of war, as they have
done so before.
Third, the President should establish a Blue Ribbon Commission evaluating
U.S. detention policies over the past seven years. The Commission needs to
examine not only issues of accountability for violations of U.S. and international
law, but should make an authoritative record and issue recommendations regarding
victim reparations for those who were imprisoned by U.S. officials or under U.S.
authority by mistake. The Commission could also make recommendations
concerning items 4-7, below.
Fourth, the President should immediately issue an Executive Order
mandating humane treatment for all detainees in US. custody. It needs to be made
clear that there is no "CIA exception" to the Convention Against Torture, and that
the United States takes seriously not only its role as a beacon of freedom, human
rights and democracy, but its obligations under international law.
Fifth, the President should recommit the United States of America to the
international and domestic rule of law; by supporting and ratifying, when possible,
the many human rights and humanitarian law treaties that the United States has
eschewed during the past decade. In particular, the United States should support
the International Criminal Court, and ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the
Landmines Ban, the new cluster bomb treaty and the new Convention on Forced
Disappearances.
Sixth, the President should not issue pardons to individuals accused of war
crimes, crimes against humanity or facilitating torture or cruel, degrading or
inhumane treatment
Seventh, the President should seriously consider joining the Inter-American
system by ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights. Additionally (or
77. Matt Apuzzo & Lara Lakes Jordan, Obama team developing plan to close Guantanamo, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1I, 2008, at A5.
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alternatively) the United States could also consider establishing its own human
rights commission. It seems clear that the European Convention on Human Rights,
for example, has had a moderating influence on European efforts to address
international terrorism. For example, in A. v. Secretary of State, the U.K. House of
Lords held in 2005 that Britain could not indefinitely detain aliens suspected of
connections to terrorism.
78
There is no doubt that governments have a duty to respond to national
security threats, but they have equally important obligations to ensure the human
rights of their citizens, and their prisoners. Fear causes governments to overreact;
strong institutions help nations to respond in a more measured way. Most
democracies are members of regional human rights regimes, and many have their
own national human rights commissions. The United States could consider these
examples as it looks for ways to strengthen its own human rights record and
enhance its world leadership.
The new President should consider implementing these suggestions even
though cynics could argue that the United States has "gotten away" with
conducting the war on its own terms, without regard to, or respect for, the opinions
of mankind and the legal and institutional framework of international law. In
addition to the obvious point of enlightened self-interest-that the United States
can only achieve its objectives if it acts with legitimacy and commands respect-
there is the deeper moral question of deciding what we stand for. Do Americans
still believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with inalienable
rights, beliefs that many generations of Americans have died fighting for, beliefs
that have inspired respect and admiration for the United States the world over, and
principles that President Obama invoked in his campaign?
The war that was launched from the nightmare of September 11 has produced
the nightmare of Guantanamo, the horror of Abu Ghraib, the broken lives of the
U.S. soldiers killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deaths of tens, maybe
hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Iraqi civilians, and the shattered psyches of
America's torture and rendition victims. The United States is better than this-
surely it can temper its great power with moderation and reason, to paraphrase
Justice Jackson's famous phrase uttered at Nuremberg so many years ago. On
January 20, 2009, it is to be hoped that the 4 4 th President of the United States of
America will immediately begin to recommit the United States to respecting the
human rights of its enemies as well as its friends.
78. See A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) (appeal
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